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Much of the current interest in medical ethics seems to focus on a few
specific areas, notably the areas of human reproduction and organ
transplantation. Although many other branches of medicine are occupied
with the task of healing, preventing illness and prolonging life, these two
areas seem to capture the imagination of many as concrete examples of
medicine pushing back the frontiers of science-fiction, and opening up all
kinds of new possibilities. They purport to offer us the possibility of
creating new human beings, and of providing replacement parts for those
who are already in existence. Development in these areas of medicine
seems to take place at a phenomenal rate, in a way which is scientifically
exciting and which, from a human point of view, gives rise to a mixture of
hope and apprehension.
Medicine is in a very interesting and sensitive position, delicately
balanced as it is between the natural sciences and the human sciences. It
has to answer questions which relate to both - questions about what is
possible and about what is appropriate, about "can" and "should". Is it
possible to take human gametes, to develop an embryo and to transplant it
successfully into the womb, and is it appropriate? Can I successfully graft a
portion of brain tissue from one person, into the brain of another; should
I? Indeed, one aspect of decision-making in medical ethics, which tends to
add considerably to the confusion, and to render many ethical decisions
suspect, is when the acceptability of a procedure is made to follow from the
fact that it is possible to carry it out "successfully", rather than from any
consideration of what is actually involved in human terms.
Personhood, then, is a key question for medical ethics. If we are to have
any possibility of dealing with the ethical questions which are posed by
human fertilization in-vitro, organ transplants, and many of the other
developments of modern medicine, we need to be able to answer the
question about what is in the test-tube or on the operating table. We need
to be able to recognize what is a person from what is not. We need to have
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reliable criteria for determining when a person begins to be and when one
ceases to be present.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of "person" as it has
developed since its origins as a theological term in the early centuries of the
Christian era. [t will become clear that ongoing development is not a denial
of completeness as a person , either in philosophical or biological terms.
The relationship between personhood and the right to life will be discussed
in the context of in-vitro fertilization and the use of embryos.
Boethius and Aquinas
The first systematic definition of "person" is the definition of Boethius:
"Person is an individual substance of rational nature." This definition is
the subject of discussion by Aquinas in the first book of the Summa
Theologica (Aquinas, 1964/ 6, lae. , 29). It is a definition which Aquinas
broadly accepts, with one particular reservation. The term "substance", as
earlier generations of philosophers had also noticed, is ambiguous.
Sometimes it is used in a way which means simply "essence". At other
times it is used in a way which is synonymous with "hypostasis" or
"subsistens", implying an actual reality and not just an essence. What is at
the heart of the problem here is whether Boethius uses the term
"substance'.' in the sense of something which actually exists, or only in the
sense of the concept. It is possible to have a concept of "doctor" (let us call
it "doctorhood") but the concept is not the reality. Doctorhood cannot
perform surgery, or write a prescription. To do these things , we need to
have an actually existing doctor.
Aquinas's objection , then, is not that Boethius's definition is wrong, but
that it is open to misinterpretation . Because of his use of the word
"substance", it is not sufficiently clear whether he considers "person" to be
a reality, existing in its own right, or just a concept.
In his earlier works (e.g. Summa Contra Gentiles and the first part of the
Summa Theologica). Aquinas makes regular use of the term "subsistens"
to express a distinct entity which stands firm by reason of its own separate
existence. Separate existence is the characteristic of an entity which is
complete in itself, and distinct from anything else.
When we go on to the third part of the Summa Theologica we find
Aquinas referring explictly to being (existence) as a constitutive element of
a person.
Both existence and activity belong to the person and derive from the nature. but
in different ways . Existence is an element in the actual realisation of the person ;
under this aspect. therefore. it is to be considered as the ultimate perfection.
(Aquinas. 1964/ 6. 3ae. 19. I ad 4) .

In the third part also he demonstrates an obvious preference for
describing a person as a "subsistent in an intellectual nature", precisely
beca use the term "subsistens" incorporates the notion of separate
existence. By using the term "subsistens" in his definition of "person",
November, 1989
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Aquinas is expressing his understanding that a person is a) an entity, and
not just a concept; b) a whole and not just a part.
The fresh insight which Aquinas brings to the question of personhood is
his explanation that separate existence and intellectual nature (essence)
together are constitut ive of persons. He also makes the important point
that the activity of a person is not const ituti ve of the person, but rather
consequent on its being a person (Aquinas , 1964( 6, 3ae, 19, I ad 4). In
other words, I am not a person because of what I do, but rather I can do
what I do because I am a person.
In conclusion, then, for Aquinas , a person cannot be what lacks its own
separate existence. On the ot her hand, a person can exist without
necessarily performing all , or indeed, to be logically consistent, any of the
activity appropriate to a rational nature.

Alternatives to Realism: (1) Empiricism
Aquinas's understanding of person is conditioned by the fact that he
admits the possibility, indeed the reality, ofa world mediated by meaning,
and not just the inner world of immediate experience. By immediate
experience, I mean consciousness which has no reference to anyth ing
outside the self.
For Aquinas, experience leads to reflection and insight, and to
judgments about the truth of reality. For Empiricists such as Locke and
H ume, the only reality is that of immediate experience. H ume is convinced
that there cannot be identifiable things because , in reality, everything is
composed of success ive and closely related parts, and these on ly appear to
our minds as if continuous.
What will suffice to prove the hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer
is to show from daily experience and observation. th at the objects which are
variable or interrupted. and yet are supposed to continue the same. are such onl y
as consist of a succession of parts. connected together by resemblance. contiguity
or causation. (Hume. 1888. p. 255) .
Such a view of the world, of necessity, conditions the empiricists'
understanding of what a person is. If there is only the appearance of unity
and identity about things in general, and they do not actua ll y exist as
concrete entities outside the consciousness of the observer , then the same
must be true of the "Self'. Continuity as a Self, or personal identity, is
dependent on continuous self-consciousness. Locke would describe a
person as "a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and
can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and
places." (Locke, 1975, 11, 9,28).
H ume takes Locke's idea one step further in that he chooses to recognize
"person" as "just a train of consciousness" and sees even the unity of
consciousness as purely circumstantial.
For my part. when I enter most intimately into what I call myself. I always
stumble on some perception or other. of heat or cold, light or shade, love or
hatred , pain or pleasure. I can never catch myselFat any time without a perception
and never ca n observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are
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removed for any time , as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself and
may truly be said not to exist" . (Hume, 1888, p. 252).

The legacy of the empiricists is to be found, alive if not well, in the
writings of people such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley and John Harris,
on such topics as the treatment of the handicapped newborn. Each of these
writers defines personhood in terms of the immediate experience of a
person as consciously self-aware, as having desires and interests. What
they are in effect saying is that we can only experience ourselves and others
as persons by the actual exercise of rationality , and that beyond that
experience , we have no grounds for asserting the existence of a person .
Singer, an Australian philosopher teaching at Monash University,
concludes:
When I think of myself as the person I now am, I realise that I did not come into
existence until sometime after my birth. At birth I had no sense of the future , and
no experiences which I can now remember as mine. It is the beginning of the life of
the person , rather than of the physical organism, that is crucial so far as the right
to life is concerned. (Singer, and Kuhse, 1985, p. 133).

The failure of the approach of Locke and Hume , and more recently of the
school of thought represented by Singer, Harris and Tooley is that, in
basing personhood on the ability to desire, to have a continuous
consciousness, to achieve a certain distinctly human level of performance,
they overlook the fact that all this presupposes a being who desires, is
conscious and performs at such a level. They place considerable stress on
the actuation of an aspect of the human essence and fail to take account of
its continuous existence as a distinct human entity.
Hume denied personal identity because he experienced change, but the
concept of identity is meaningless without the possibility of change. To
express this in another way, it is only in the midst of change that we can
relevantly attribute any significance to what remains the same. If we
translate Hume's problem into the modern idiom and the modern context,
we find that what Singer et at. have done is to confuse the concept of
"personality", something which is variable and non-essential, with the
concept of "person" which is invariable and essential. To exercise
personality one must first be a person .
(2) Utilitarianism

We have seen already that there is a close correlation between the
recognition of a person and the acceptance of personal rights, such as the
right to life and to medical treatment. While realists and empiricists differ
as to the criteria which are appropriate for recognizing a person, both
viewpoints do have their criteria, and in each case, what ought to be done is
based initially on a judgment of fact about personhood. There is a direct
link between what something Is and how it ought to be treated.
Utilitarians are not prepared to allow that rights are based on objective
criteria, and this has implications for the way in which they deal with the
November, 1989
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question of personhood. The basis of Utilitarianism is to be found in the
idea that what is good consists in the creation of happiness and the
avoidance of unhappiness. John Stuart Mill , probably the best known
exponent of Utilitarianism, concedes that there is a scale of human
pleasures and happiness. such that not all pleasures are eq ually valuable or
desirable. Mill maintains that Justice is a central element of the Utilitarian
code, but admits that Justice is liable to be a subjective concept in that it
involves both a rule of cond uct and a sentiment of justice. The sentiment of
justice in his understanding is
the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself. or to those with
whom one sympathises. widened so as to include all persons by the human
capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of intellgent selfinterest (Mill. J. S .. 1962. p. J08).

Mill uses the example of the debate about the morality of slavery to
illustrate how moral decision-making tends to be influenced to a
considerable extent by what is expedient, rather than by objective criteria.
He takes this as sufficient evidence to demonstrate that expediency or the
principle of utlity is a kind of law of nature.
Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted that the rights of a slave. such
as they are. ought to be as sacred as those of the master; and that a tribunal which
fails to enforce them with equal strictness is wanting injustice: while at the same
time. institutions which leave to the slave scarcely any rights to enforce are not
deemed unjust. because they are not deemed inexpedient. Those who think that
utility requires distinctions of rank. do not think it unjust that riches and social
privileges should be unequally dispensed: but those who think this inequality
inexpedient. think it unjust also. (Mill. 1962. p. JOI)

To the extent that the sentiment of justice is based on expediency, it is
certain to be subjective and partial, and not a reliable indication of what is
truly just or good universally. Just as any decision about the rights of a
slave, according to this view, will depend on how useful slavery is perceived
to be in any given society; so the rights of an embryo or a neonate would
depend on what view society had of their usefulness (e.g., for the
preservation of the species, or for research). However Mill presents it, the
Utilitarian view of rights depends on a subjective balancing of the pleasure
of one person or group and another. The criterion is one of expediency and
the question of personhood doesn't enter into it.
We are all familiar with the classic examples of expediency (the Eskimo
grandfather left to die on the ice, the passengers thrown out of the lifeboat
so that it will continue to fioat, etc.). The reality of Utilitarianism in the
modern context is to be found, for example, in the report of the Warnock
Committee on Human Embryology. Mary Warnock, who chaired this
British Government committee, expresses in one of her papers unease at
the idea that the life or death of a child should be decided simply on the
basis of the parents' attitude. Yet she says that nothing is settled by our
deciding to call a newborn infant or an embryo a "person".

42

Linacre Quarterly

!

The question 'Is he a person?' is in effect only another way of asking 'May I or may
I not do what I like with him?' It is agreed that the appropriateness or otherwise of
the word 'person' is a matter of decision. Would it not be less confusing therefore
to go straight to the main decision , namely the decision how we ought to treat
him? (Warnock, M. , 1983, p. 240).

What Warnock seems not to take into account is the fact that when we
prescind from the question whether the infant or the embryo is or is not a
person , we are left with no option but to make the decision about rights or
about treatment depend on the preference of some other party. Without
the question about personhood , the objective basis for any decision is
removed .
So , while the empiricists narrow their consideration about personhood
to one aspect of the essence of a person, and ignore the continuity of
existence ; the Utilitarians , ignoring any objective consideration of human
existence or essence , make personhood a non-question and , in so doing for
all practical purposes decree that no one is to be considered a person
except for reasons of expediency.

Lonergan: Person as Dynamic Being
The attempt to deal with moral questions without some kind of
objective base is doomed to failure. We have seen that any attempt to
bypass the person or to see the person purely in terms of function or
activity (essence) is inadequate.
Bernard Lonergan , the distinguished theologian and philosopher who
has taught at Harvard , in Rome and at Boston College , re-affirms the basic
principle of realism, that all things (including persons) are constituted by
both essence and existence. He makes a distinction between what we know
by common sense through perception , and the underlying reality which we
judge to be (exist) on the basis of our perceptions. The data which we
perceive and even the concepts which we form are objects of experience,
but cannot properly be called things.
With an object of experience (e .g. , a landscape) the aggregate of data
changes from time to time , but such change is possible only because there is
some entity , underlying the data , in which the change takes place. This is
what we mean by a thing, and Lonergan describes it as an "intelligible
concrete unity". Bya process of elimination , he concludes that the basis for
this unity is not to be found in accidents, principles , parts , potencies or
essence. There is only one possible explanation for the transcendent unity
which is the hallmark of a thing, and that is the having of its own separate
existence . It is in a distinctly existing entity that accidents , principles ,
possibilities and essence are all brought together. (cf. Lonergan , I 964a ,
p.21).
The principal fact worth noting at this stage is that a thing is strictly one,
while at the same time , our sense experience reveals the possibility of
change in things. It follows that being and change , far from being in
conflict , are related. Being is a pre-condition for change.
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While separate existence is the ultimate basis for recognizing a thing, the
things which exist are seen to differ according to essence, and it is on this
basis that we classify them according to species. A person is defined as a
thing, the essence (or nature) of which is to be rational. The term has been
classically used to refer to God , to angels, and to human beings. To be a
thing involves completeness , distinctness and internal unity. But what
exactly does it mean to be "of an intellectual nature"?
Lonergan defines intellectual nature as "nature which can operate over
the whole range of being by understanding and willing" (cf.; Lonergan,
1964a, p. 24). The whole range of being includes the metaphysical; the
transcendent. But it is precisely here that the empiricists and their heirs run
into trouble. For them, a nature which can operate over the whole range of
being by understanding and willing must be experienced as so acting in
practice and , failing to experience this activity, they conclude that there is
no person .
Lonergan introduces an important distinction into the debate about
being, and so into our understanding of personhood. This is the distinction
between central act and potency, and conjugate act and potency. "Act" is a
technical term which implies completion, while "potency" implies
openness to change or development. Anything which exists is in central
act , but it is invariably in potency to a further actuation (i.e. , conjugate
potency and act) . The act of being is basic and prior to all other acts, but it
is not isolated from potency to various other developments. To be
complete is not the same as to be finished developing.
Since one and the same thing is both perfectible and perfected. we have the
fundamental theorem of metaphysical composition. namely. that the very same
thing is in first potency by potency and in first act by form ; the same thing is in
second potency by form and in second act by act ; and the very same thing is in
potency by substance and in Act by its accidents (Lonergan . 1964a . p. 29).

So , it can be said of all things, and of persons in particular that their
essence or nature is a potency for any actuation beyond the act of being
itself. While the potency is not the thing itself, a thing on the way to
fulfillment is no less a thing simply because all its potential is not yet
realized. Indeed , common sense tells us that no thing can realize all of its
potential, because the actuation of some of that potential might, In
practice, preclude the actuation of some other.
Insofar as persons are concerned, intellectual activity is second or
conjugate act , while an intellectual nature is the potency for this act.
Intellectual activity therefore is not the nature of a person, but only an
expression of that nature. No human intellect can know everything
perfectly. No human potential is ever fully realized , and therefore lack of
perfection, far from being an indication of inhumanity or sub-humanity is ,
in fact, a characteristic of being human.
The human intellect, then . is only mere potency in the genus of the intelligible; in
the beginning it is comparable with a 'tabula rasa' and subsequent ly. having
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tak en in so methin g it knows nothing in act except phanta sms. (Lonergan , 1964b,
p.226).

Since being is a pre-condition for change, and both things and,
specifically , persons , while centrally in act have a potency to further or
conjugate act , it follows that to be is not necessarily to be slatic. This
metaphysical insight of considerable importance seems to hearken back to
the comment of Heraclitus , the pre-Christian Greek philosopher, that the
universe is in a state of flux. Perhaps in attempting to express the centrality
to "being" of unity and continuity, the scholastic concept of "being"
conveyed too great a sense of rigidity and inability to change. But for
Lonergan ,
Finality is the d ynamic as pec t of th e real. To affirm finality is to affirm
movement , fluidit y, tension, app roximat iveness , inco mpl eteness (Lonergan.
1958. p. 446).

and finality,
is no less the sad ness offai lu re than the joy o f success. It is to be di sce rned no less
in false sta rt s and in breakdowns than in sta bilit y a nd progress. It is as much the
meaning of aberration and co rrupti o n and decline. as is sanity and honesty a nd
development (Lonergan . 1958. p. 448).

So the la w of being is one of immanent finality - a process of becoming
more completely what one already is , in response to an end which is written
into one's essence, rather than exerted from without. An external finality is
certain and inescapable, whereas an immanent finality opens up
possi bilities and provides the means for their fulfillment.

The Embryo as Person
Biology and embryology cannot account for the coming to be of a
pe rson , because the realit y of personhood goes beyo nd the limits of
biology. However it is important to note that the concept of a "person"
who is and is yet becoming. and who may never reach activity of a
recognizably human kind, is not in conflict with the laws of biology.
While life is cyclical, animal organisms are distinct and entire in
themse lves and ha ve an identifiable moment of origin. As an entity ,
genet ically related to but distinct from both its parents , the human embryo
is complete by the time of the first mitotic di vision.
The parts of the plasmalemma of th e spermatozoo n and the egg. outside the zo ne
of contact. fuse together in a conti nu o us sheet. The cytop las mi c contents of the
two ga metes are now in direct continuity. Although the shape of the
spermatozoon ma y yet be distinguishable . the two game tes at thi s stage have
become one single ce ll (Ba linsky. 198 1, p. 112).

If all the genetic information perta ining to the new organism were not
contained in the first embryo nic cell, then it could not be replicated
throughout the organism as it developed . The new organism is , in the
Novem ber, 1989
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terminology of Lonergan, "a distinct subsistent". It is not a part of
something else, nor is it just a collection of cells without any internal unity.
But to be complete is not necessarily to be static. The human organism
contains within itself a finality - a tendency to develop certain perfections
which are in keeping with its nature. There is no way, however, of
predicting all of the factors which may, at any subsequent stage, contribute
to or interfere with the development of the organism. As Lonergan has
reminded us above, finality is expressed in failure as well as in success.
Apple trees bear fruit or do not bear fruit, they flourish or they die, they
spread their branches to varying degrees , yet we never question the
fundamental fact of what they are.
It is not sufficient, of course, that the human organism subsists
distinctly. It is that fact that it subsists precisely in an intellectual nature ,
which is a potency for all kinds of activity including knowing and willing,
that is significant. This is what makes it possible for us to recognize the
human embryo as a person from the time when it begins to exist as a new
genetic and spiritual entity, until it ceases to be.
Personhood as a Criterion for the Right to Life
Many of the reasons which are presented for respecting the right to life
of persons derive from the Judaeo-Christian tradition . The first chapter of
the book of Genesis suggests that human beings , the final stroke of God's
creative genius, made in His own image , are of special value. To be made in
God's image has nothing to do with appearance or ]Jerformance, but
implies the potential for relationship with God . The birth of Jesus Christ
and His human life establishes a new intimacy and a permanence in God's
relationship with the human race. For those of us who are Christian, these
reasons are perfectly valid for recognition of the right to life of all persons,
because the y form part of what we believe, and our ethical judgments must
be based on what we believe.
"The Vatican Instruction on Human Life in Its Origins" expresses the
Church's understanding of personhood as a criterion for the right to life , as
follows:
From the moment of conception. the life of every human being is to be respected
in an absolute way, because man is the only creature on earth that God has
'wis hed for himself and the spi ritual soul of each man is 'immediately created' by
God; his whole being bears the image of th e creator. Human life is sacred because,
from its beginning it involves the 'c reati ve action of God' and it remain s forever in
a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end . (Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith. 1987. p. II).

But, even outside the context of Christian or other religious belief,
personhood is no less significant as a criterion for the right to life . The fact
that personhood can be attributed in the same measure to an embryo, to a
neonate, to a mature adult and to a geriatric patient, does not mean that
they are all "the same", but it does mean that there is no basis in reality for
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distinguishing between them insofar as the right to life is concerned .
Persons are defined in terms of what they are. not in terms of how fully
they have actuated their potential. A person. by definition. is being-fora nd-i n-itself. irrespective of what or even whether someone else wants it to
be. In simple terms. what it is determines how it ought to be treated. The
righllO life either applies lO all persons or it does not apply to any of them .
One person cannot decide that the life of another is disposable. without
logically deciding the same about his own.

An Application: In- Vitro Fertilization
In-vitro fertilization as a process for bypassing human infertility.
involves the aspiration of mature oocytes (eggs) in large quantities from
the mother-to-be. and their fertilization with treated sperm provided by
the male. This fertilization takes place in a dish (the "test-tube") and the
embryos thus produced are "grown on" in the dish and monitored for a few
days. after which some or all are transferred to the mother's uterus. Those
which remain, if any. may be frozen and stored for further attempts during
a later cycle. used for research purposes. or disposed of.
Since embryos actually subsist . and are of an intellectual nature. it is
appropriate that we ask, "What are the implications of IVF for these
persons?"
a.

Multiple transfers: .
The practice of using two or three embryos on anyone occasion is
designed to increase the possibility of pregnancy. It has. however. been
shown to reduce the chances of survival of each individ ual embryo. (cf.
Luno and Mondejar. 1986. p. 48) . Thus the acceptance of this practice
involves the implication that it is expedient that a person or persons
should die so that others may be parents. It places the right to
parenthood above the right to life.
'

b.

Freeze-storage:
This process has been shown greatly to reduce the chances of survival
of the individ ual em bryo. (cf.. Senate Select Com mittee. 1986. p. 129).
It does provide more chances of pregnancy without the need to
multiply the number of laparoscopies. As in the case of a. (above) it
implies that human convenience is the primary consideration. It could
be said that the embryo becomes the ultimate in frozen consumer
products.

I,

I

The Vatican Instruction, referred to above. states that:
The free7ing of embryos. even when carried out in order to preserve the life
of an embryo - cryopreservation - constitutes an offence against the
respect due to human beings by exposing them to grave risks of death or
harm to their physical integrity and depriving them. at least temporarily. of
maternal shelter and gestation. thus placing them in a situation in which
further offences and manipulation are possible. (Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith. 1987. p. 19)
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c.

Research:
Under present conditions, research on human embryos is inevitably
destructive. It is undeniable that much valuable knowledge about
genetic disorders can be achieved by means of this research , but only at
the expense of the individ ual embryo, on whom the research is carried
out. The Declaration of Helsinki makes a distinction between
biomedical research which may be of benefit to the patient / subject and
research which is non-therapeutic. It states that
In research on man the interests of science and society should never take
precedence over considerations related to the well-being of the subject.
(Declarat ion of Helsinki , 1975, 111 , 4)

The Warnock committee approves even the production of embryos
specifically for research (Warnock, 1985, p. 69), while the Australian
Senate Committee, in line with the Helsinki Declaration, rejects
experimentation on an embryo which is "invasive and destructive of
that embryo". (Senate Select Committee, 1986, p. 16). It is significant
that, although the Australian Senate Select Committee approves invitro fertilization, its rejection of any form of experimentation on
embryos is based firmly on a particular understanding of the nature of
the embryo.
If, as is the view of the committee, the embryo may be described as
genetically new human life, organised as a distinct entity oriented towards
further development , then the stance and behaviour proper to adopt
towards it would include not frustrating a process which commands respect ,
because its thrust is towards the further development of a biologically
individuated member of the human species. (Senate Select Committee, 1986,
p.25).

Unfortunately, this very positive view of the embryo , held by the
Select Committee, does not lead the Committee to reject other
procedures which frustrate the healthy development of the embryo,
e.g., frozen storage and disposal.
Oliver O'Donovan , an Angelican priest / philosopher, points out
that it is not really possible to condemn research on embryos and yet
accept IYF because, irrespective of where and when the research took
place, it was and remains a necessary pre-condition of the success of
IYF. "Our view of IYF", he concludes, "is necessarily determined by
our view of non-clinical research on early embryos" (O'Donovan,
1984, p. 80).
The implication of research on embryos is that a person can be a
means to an end. Here value is to be found in what I can achieve
through her use, not in what she is or can be in herself. This is a
common enough pre-supposition also in relation to born persons (e .g.,
in attitudes towards labor, economic policy, and military strategy).
d . Disposal:
Som embryos are disposed of because they are not needed, others are
48
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rejected because they are seen to fall short of the required standard. In
either case , the human significance of the disposal of embryos is that
persons are of no intrinsic value. It is not uncommon to meet adult
prod ucts of the same attitude - people who are left to one side because
they are surplus to requirements, or because they don't measure up.
e.

["

I

Re-implantation:
The "lucky" embryos are those which are successfully transferred ,
anything between 2% and 10%. But even in success there are important
human implications. The question has been raised, not unreasonably,
as to how an embryo who is manufactured by a process of modern
technology, rather than begotten of a loving embrace , can be
understood as being-for-and-in-itself. This is not to suggest that
parents of IYF children love their children any less than other parents,
but is simply a reflection of how intrusive technology can be. The
parent who lives out his own dreams and ambitions in his child is a
well-known stereotype. Could IYF represent the ultimate in
being-for-another?

i

Conclusion:
In conclusion , in-vitro fertilization , of its very nature, has depended and
will continue to depend on embryo research which is invasive and
destructive . The conditions and assumptions which offer the greatest
possibility of successful in-vitro fertilization are those which require that
the embryo be regarded as disposable, and of no value in itself.
Medicine is directed toward the well-being of persons , through the
prevention and healing of sickness and disease, the alleviation of pain, and
the care of those who are suffering. In-vitro fertilization does not fall into
any of these categories, and is found to be implicitly and explicitly in
conflict with the respect due to the embryo as person. It cannot, therefore,
be considered to be ethical.
"In-vitro" fertilization is but one of many aspects of medical practice
and biotechnology about which an appropriate ethical judgment can be
made only in the light of an adequate concept of "person". Others would
include pre-natal diagnosis , our treatment of handicapped newborn,
geriatric, psychiatric and comatose patients, as well as decisions about
resuscitation after cardiac arrest. Attempts to make suchjudgments, while
bypassing the judgment about personhood , or while confusing "person"
with "personality", lead only to failure and confusion.
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